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PRISTINE SOLITUDE OR EQUAL FOOTING? SAN JUAN
COUNTY V. UNITED STATES AND UTAH'S LARGER BID TO
ASSERT CONTROL OVER PUBLIC LANDS IN THE WESTERN
UNITED STATES
ABSTRACT
Within the Mining Act of 1866 there is a brief provision known as
Revised Statute 2477 (R.S. 2477) that has reignited the anti-federal fer-
vor of western citizens and states' rights advocates demanding a return of
federal public lands to more localized management. R.S. 2477 granted
counties and states a right-of-way across federal and through the pub-
lic's use of a particular route. R.S. 2477 was repealed in 1976, but rights-
of-way that vested prior to this date remain valid if claimants can provide
proof of the route's historic use. Federal courts and land management
agencies have struggled to decipher this statutory relic in a modem con-
text. Of the states attempting to use R.S. 2477 as part of a broader effort
to balance out the long-standing inequity over control of public lands
within western states, Utah has been the most aggressive. In San Juan
County v. United States, a controversy involving the National Park Ser-
vice's decision to close a nine-mile trail along a riverbed in Canyonlands
National Park to motor vehicles, the Tenth Circuit held that Utah and San
Juan County failed to establish the requisite ten years of continuous pub-
lic use of the Salt Creek road as a "public thoroughfare" prior to the res-
ervation of Canyonlands in 1964. The court recognized that frequency is
an important factor when analyzing the public's use and that use under a
private right is not sufficient in determining whether a public highway
has been established.
This Comment starts by looking at the larger dispute at play over
the vast amounts of federally controlled public lands in the western Unit-
ed States. It then explores the history of R.S. 2477 and the Tenth Cir-
cuit's prior treatment of this old frontier law. The San Juan decision rais-
es the bar for R.S. 2477 claimants by recognizing a more stringent test
for demonstrating continuous use by the public-filling a much needed
gap in R.S. 2477 jurisprudence. However, the heavy emphasis on evalu-
ating historic evidence and uniqueness of every R.S. 2477 road is a reali-
ty that limits the reach of any one particular court decision. Nevertheless,
the San Juan decision will have a significant effect on how litigants and
other western states approach the thousands of R.S. 2477 disputes certain
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INTRODUCTION
In Edward Abbey's renowned book, Desert Solitaire, he asserted
"No more cars in national parks. Let the people walk."' Abbey's 1968
autobiographical work about his various encounters as a park ranger in
the Colorado Plateau region of the southwestern United States describes
his philosophy of the desert ecosystem, and in particular, his view that
vehicles traversing through the canyons disturb the harmony struck be-
tween nature and nothingness.2 There are many Americans who share
Abbey's perspective that motorized tourists are a fundamental threat to
the national park idea, while many others believe road access through
these spectacular landscapes is a right that is often unjustly curtailed by
regulations imposed by federal land management agencies. Recently, in
1. EDWARD ABBEY, DESERT SOLITAIRE: A SEASON IN THE WILDERNESS 65 (Ballantine
Books ed., 1968).
2. Id. (proclaiming that "desert canyons are holier than our churches," and since we do not
drive cars into cathedrals and "other sanctums of our culture," we should keep automobiles out of
national parks as well).
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San Juan, the Tenth Circuit decided a longstanding dispute over access
to a historic route that cuts through Canyonlands National Park on its
way to the iconic natural rock formation known as Angel Arch.3 The
legal issue centers on a brief provision of the Lode Mining Act of 1866,
known as Revised Statute 2477 (R.S. 2477).4
R.S. 2477 drew little attention for almost a century, but it has been
thrust into the forefront of a contentious battle over access to "roads"
within public land managed by federal government agencies, as well as
western citizens' larger bid to assert claims over federal lands in favor of
more localized management. R.S. 2477 provides that "the right of way
for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for pub-
lic uses, is hereby granted."5 This single clause, enacted without any leg-
islative history, is only one sentence long and on its face appears to be
rather straightforward.6 Nevertheless, it has been a headache for lower
courts, federal land agencies, and private property owners attempting to
flesh out exactly how to apply the nineteenth century statute in the mod-
7ern era.
R.S. 2477 was passed during a time when the federal government
sought to encourage western expansion by granting easements over unre-
served public lands.8 These rights-of-way were "subject only to state law
and did not require specific federal approval."9 In 1976, Congress re-
pealed this statutory relic though the enactment of the Federal Land Poli-
cy Management Act (FLPMA), but it did not extinguish valid preexisting
rights-of-way, which may exist "if claimants can prove an R.S. 2477
claim predating 1976."Io As part of the broader anti-federal fervor that
arose when public land management policy shifted "from expansion to
preservation," conflicting issues over the 150-year-old mining law's ap-
plication began to arise." Now, state and local governments see R.S.
3. San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 2014).
4. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and
for Other Purposes, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (repealed 1976).
5. Id.
6. Jacob Macfarlane, Note, How Many Cooks Does It Take to Spoil a Soup? San Juan Coun-
ty v. U.S. and Interventions in R.S. 2477 Land Disputes, 29 J. LAND, RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 227,
228 (2009).
7. See Heidi McIntosh, New Highways Under an Old Law? R.S. 2477 and its Implications
for the Future of Utah's Federal Public Lands, 18 UTAH B.J., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 16. ("Little did
Congress know when it enacted this little-known provision that it had sown the seeds for a contro-
versy that would take us from the hoop skirts of the mid-19th century to the computer age.").
8. Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 229-30 (2009) (explaining the policies behind R.S. 2477 at
the time of its enactment in 1866).
9. JAN, G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 324 (2d ed. 2012).
10. Id.
11. Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 227; see also Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2793. Before the 1960s, development of natural
resources on public land followed the principals of wise use and sustained yield management, but a
new conservation ethic began to emerge that emphasized preservation over use. R. McGREGGOR
CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS 11 (1993).
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2477 as part of their arsenal in a larger effort to balance out the long-
standing inequity over management of public lands within their borders
that is currently dominated by the federal government.12 State and local
officials argue that these rights-of-way are "crucial to economic pro-
spects and quality of life" for rural citizens across the West who depend
on access for their livelihoods.13 Environmentalists, on the other hand,
"view R.S. 2477 as an illegitimate means of defeating designation of
wilderness areas, which must be roadless" and other non-economic val-
ues of public land.14 Wilderness proponents and preservationists point
out that many of these old routes claimed to be "highways" are really just
"dirt tracks, stream bottoms, livestock trails, and other faint paths" that
do not lead to any established anthropogenic destination.'5 After several
legislative and administrative attempts failed to resolve the uncertainty
surrounding R.S. 2477 ultimately failed, the federal courts became re-
sponsible for deciding the validity of R.S. 2477 claims.16 Over the last
fifty years federal courts have teased out various elements to provide
guidance in R.S. 2477 disputes, but the effect of any court opinion is
limited due to the unique history of every road, so resolving an R.S. 2477
dispute must still be determined on a road-by-road basis.'7
In April of 2014, after decades of litigation and furious debate over
the National Park Service's decision to close a nine-mile trail along a
riverbed in Canyonlands National Park to motor vehicles, the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided San Juan County v. United States.' In a unanimous deci-
sion, the court held that Utah and San Juan County failed to establish
"ten years of continuous public use of the Salt Creek Road as a public
thoroughfare prior to the reservation of Canyonlands National Park in
1964" based on historical evidence of cattle grazing, mining operations,
and exploratory travel along the route.19 The court confirmed that fre-
12. William F. Jasper, Feds vs. the West, NEW AM. (May 3, 2014),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/item/18177-feds-vs-the-west ("[M]any of the Western
states are demanding their 'equal footing' as sovereign states, free from the shackles of an oppres-
sive federal 'landlord."').
13. Brian Maffly, Ruling Sticks: Salt Creek Not a County Highway, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Sept.
9, 2014, 10:33 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/58389383-90/amp-court-roads-
salt.html.csp?page=2 (reporting the Tenth Circuit's decision to deny an en banc rehearing and the
dismay of Utah officials with the April 2014 decision).
14. 2 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW § 15:19 (2d ed. 2014).
15. See LAITOS, supra note 9, at 325.
16. Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 227; see also COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 14, at
§ 15:19 (discussing the fact that "[t]here is no formal administrative process by which persons claim-
ing R.S. 2477 rights-of-way can solicit binding determinations from the Interior Department as to
their existence and validity").
17. For a sampling of R.S. 2477 cases, see Kane Cnty. v. Salazar, 562 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir.
2009); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005); Sierra Club v. Hodel,
848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988) overruled in part on other grounds by Vill. of Los Ranchos De
Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992); Kane Cnty. v. United States, No. 2:08-CV-
00315, 2011 WL 2489819 (D. Utah June 21, 2011).
18. 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014).
19. Id. at 801.
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quency of public use is an important factor and that use under a private
right is not sufficient in determining whether a public highway has been
established.20
By looking at the San Juan decision, the aim of this Comment is to
provide guidance for this murky body of law and to highlight the broader
issues at play in the controversial debate over control and management of
western public lands. Part I explores the larger debate over the vast
amounts of federally controlled land concentrated in western states, and
Utah's use of R.S. 2477 as a mechanism to retain control of roadways
within the state's borders. Part II reviews the history of R.S. 2477, ad-
dresses prior Tenth Circuit cases, and provides context for the San Juan
decision. Part III summarizes San Juan's facts, procedural history, and
the Tenth Circuit's unanimous decision. Part IV examines San Juan's
precedential value and its effect on R.S. 2477 cases going forward, ex-
plores potential nonlitigation alternatives for land management agencies
looking for a more efficient way to resolve issues surrounding this old
frontier law, and discusses San Juan's potential implications for other
western states looking to jump on the R.S. 2477 bandwagon.
I. WESTERN STATES' HOSTILITY TOWARDS FEDERAL LAND
MANAGEMENT
It is difficult to grasp the modem fallout and possible ramifications
of R.S. 2477 without first understanding the political backdrop that
drives such fierce debate on both sides of the controversy. The dispute
over R.S. 2477 can easily be framed into larger arguments about federal-
ism. and the long-standing imbalance of federal land ownership that ex-
ists in the western United States. During the nineteenth century, when
territory was added to the United States by purchase, treaty, or conquest,
almost all of it became part of the unappropriated public domain.2 1 Pro-
spective western states, in exchange for land grants, relinquished claims
to large swaths of unappropriated lands within their boundaries.2 In a
2012 study, the Congressional Research Service reported that the federal
government owns nearly 30% of the land in the United States, mostly in
the West and Alaska.2 3 With most of this federal ownership concentrated
20. See id at 796.
21. Louis Touton, Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 818 (1980) ("In admitting new states, however, Congress retained 'unap-
propriated lands' within their borders and continued its policy of encouraging settlement and devel-
opment.").
22. MICHAEL P. DOMBECK ET AL., FROM CONQUEST TO CONSERVATION: OUR PUBLIC LANDS
LEGACY 10 (2003).
23. Ross W. GORTE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP:
OVERVIEW AND DATA, at summary (2012) ("62% of Alaska is federally owned, as is 47% of the II
coterminous western states. By contrast, the federal government owns only 4% of lands in the other
states.").
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24in the eleven coterminous western states, controversies over land own-
ership and demands for more localized management are inevitable.25
For more than a century the federal government sought to dispose
much of the public land in order to encourage settlement of the West, but
eventually emphasis shifted to retention and preservation.2 6 By the end of
the nineteenth century, a conservation ethic began to emerge-sparked
by the public's concern over federal land management practices.27 Feder-
al rangelands were greatly overgrazed, much of the prime hardwood for-
ests had been clearcut without efforts to regenerate the timber supply,
and "[c]oncerns continued to grow that mining, timber, and grazing in-
terests had monopolized the frontier." 2 8 The passage of FLPMA in 1976,
with its fundamental emphasis on public land conservation, was the first
concrete recognition by Congress that the public domain should remain
under federal control unless otherwise provided by agency planning.29
However, the idea of permanent reservations was hard for many [Ameri-
cans] to accept, and the concept was at odds with the entrenched ideal of
Manifest Destiny that Americans had a right to conquer the land without
government interference.30 The conservation ethic was greeted with es-
pecially little fanfare in western states where large amounts of public
land remained under federal control.31 Constituents within these states
came to view the federal government's reservation policy as "retarding
their development, slowing down their progress, and keeping them in
thralldom to a remote government not capable of understanding their
needs."32 From the perspective of local residents, environmentalists from
far away had carved a dominant position of influence in federal land pol-
icy decisions, creating "an underlying bias in favor of preservation over
development."33
24. Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Wyoming,
Nevada, and New Mexico. Id.
25. For a comprehensive history of public land law, see PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC
LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 30 (1968) (explaining that many western representatives in Congress are
very critical about the large proportion of the natural resources within their states which are still held
by the Federal government).
26. See GORTE ET AL., supra note 23, at 2.
27. DOMBECK ET AL., supra note 22, at 16-17.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 26-27. Other relevant environmental statutes passed prior to FLPMA include the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 and National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which requires
federal agencies to perform environmental impact statements (EIS) for all "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Patrick Austin Perry, Comment, Law
West of the Pecos: The Growth of the Wise-Use Movement and the Challenge to Federal Public
Land-Use Policy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 275, 292 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
30. See GATES, supra note 25, at 771.
31. Id. at 772.
32. Id.
33. See CAWLEY, supra note 11, at 9.
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Western states demanding that the federal government hand over
public land within their borders is not a new occurrence,34 but when the
emphasis shifted to retention and preservation, land rights advocates be-
came more assertive in their hostility towards federal land manage-
ment.35 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, land rights advocates who be-
lieved federal management policies had become overly responsive to
environmental preservation concerns began to mobilize and organize a
protest in what came to be known as the Sagebrush Rebellion. In the
early 1990s, a similar grass-roots effort, known as the County Supremacy
Movement, sought to protect property rights and return governmental
power to local officials. 37
Part of this federalism-infused debate is rooted in arguments impli-
cated by the "equal footing" doctrine.3 ' The doctrine was upheld by sev-
eral Supreme Court cases, most notably the Court's 1845 decision in
Pollard v. Hagan,39 and it stands for the principle that "each
state ... entered the Union on an equal constitutional footing with the
original thirteen."40 Because the equal footing doctrine establishes that
states admitted to the United States are given the same legal rights as
preexisting states, many western land rights advocates view the federal
dominance of land ownership in their states as a violation of this consti-
tutional principle.41 However, equal footing only guarantees that states
have "equal authority" within the federal system, and Congress may use
its power to adapt legislation according to "diverse local needs" unique
to each state.42 Hence, without more than "purely economic considera-
tions or unequal treatment, the equal footing doctrine provides no judi-
cially enforceable remedy" to western states wishing to invoke it in an
effort to divest the federal government of public lands within their bor-
ders.43 Thus, the notion of public land belonging to all U.S. citizens has
remained "a concept basic to the formation of the Union itself."" None-
theless, anti-federal fervor still invokes passion among western officials
and local land rights advocates, and as their efforts have increased in
34. "At the Western Governors' Conference in 1913 and 1914 a demand was voiced for the
cession of all remaining public lands" to be given back to "states in which they were located."
GATES, supra note 25, at 30.
35. See GATES, supra note 25, at 8.
36. See CAWLEY, supra note I1, at 14.
37. Alexander H. Southwell, Comment, The County Supremacy Movement: The Federalism
Implications ofa 1990s States'Rights Battle, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 417, 420-21 (1996-97).
38. See generally Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New
Federalism and State Jurisdiction on Public Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557 (1995) (explaining that R.S.
2477 arguments lend themselves to easy extrapolation into larger arguments about federalism).
39. 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
40. Touton, supra note 21, at 833; see also Pollard, 44 U.S. at 228-29.
41. See Jasper, supra note 12.
42. Touton, supra note 21, at 834-35.
43. Id. at 835 (footnote omitted).
44. DOMBECK ET AL., supra note 22, at 10 ("The public lands belong to all the people.").
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recent decades, they have looked for other mechanisms to pursue their
objectives."
In Utah, 66% of the land acreage is federally owned.46 While other
western states have been aggressive in their efforts to gain control over
federally managed public land within their borders, Utah has relied most
heavily on R.S. 2477 as a mechanism to fulfill this objective.47 To ana-
lyze the controversy it is helpful to understand the geological makeup of
the region and view the situation from the perspective of those who call
the "Canyon Country"48 home. The R.S. 2477 debate has been most in-
tense in the southern part of the state, where the land is mostly arid de-
sert, characterized by deep winding canyons and unique erosional forms
in the colorful sedimentary rock.49 As early settlers quickly found out,
the landscape is much less hospitable to eastern farming practices and
large community development than other parts of the country.50 In fact,
the 1.5 million acres within the Greater Canyonlands "makes up 'the
largest remaining block of undeveloped land in the lower 48.'"51 There
has been historical grazing and a few oil and mineral booms in the re-
gion, but most residents today see tourism and recreation as the most
promising economic venture in the region.52 In 2012, "41 percent of all
jobs in Canyon Country [where four of Utah's five national parks are
located] were in the leisure and hospitality sector."53 The red rock wil-
45. For example, on April 18, 2014, more than fifty political leaders and officials from nine
Western states attended the Legislative Summit on the Transfer of Public Lands in Salt Lake City to
discuss ways of retaining control of federal lands they consider to be poorly managed. Kristen
Moulton, Western Lawmakers Gather in Utah to Talk Federal Land Takeover, SALT LAKE TRIB.
(Apr. 19, 2014, 7:13 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/57836973-90/utah-lands-lawmakers-
federal.html.csp.
46. GORTE ET AL., supra note 23, at 5.
47. In 2012, Utah enacted a statute authorizing the use of taxpayers to claim around 25,000 of
these historical rights-of-way on federal land. Hillary Hoffmann & Sara Imperiale, Recent Surge in
"Ghost Roads" Litigation Threatens National Parks and Other Federally Protected Lands, VT. J.
ENVTL. L., http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/topten/recent-surge-in-ghost-roads-litigation-threatens-
national-parks-and-other-federally-protected-lands/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
48. Jennifer Leaver, The State of Utah 's Tourism, Travel and Recreation Industry, 73 UTAH
ECON. & BUS. REV. 1 (2014), available at
https://bebr.business.utah.edu/sites/default/files/uebr20l3no4.pdf.
49. San Juan County, UTAH DIv. OF STATE HISTORY,
http://ilovehistory.utah.gov/place/counties/sanjuan.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
50. DOMBECK ET AL., supra note 22, at 15.
51. RANDY T. SIMMONS & RYAN M. YONK, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF SOUTHERN UTAH
WILDERNESS ALLIANCE LITIGATION ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES 19 (2013), available at
http://www.strata.org/wp-content/uploads/ipePublications/Economic-Impacts-of-Southern-Utah-
Wilderness-Alliance-on-Lcoal-Comminities.pdf (quoting Brian Maffly, Utah Democrats Call for
Greater Canyonlands Protections, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 5, 2013, 10:20 PM),
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/55771848-90/canyonlands-county-greater-landscape.html.csp).
52. UTAH DIV. OF STATE HISTORY, supra note 49.
53. See Leaver, supra note 48, at 5. Employment data based on detailed tourism-orientated
NAICS codes are often unavailable at the county level, but one way to determine a region's depend-
ence on the tourism industry is to calculate the area's share of leisure and hospitality jobs compared
to total jobs.
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derness is particularly valuable for recreational off-highway vehicle
(OHV) use, and it is an important part of local economies.54
If OHV is limited by wilderness designation or other agency deci-
sions, many local residents fear that tourism will decline, imposing an
adverse economic effect on those communities.5 A majority of residents
in southern Utah are politically conservative, and agency decisions based
on non-economic values of public lands (such as wilderness designation)
often encounter fierce animosity from local residents. In 2012 and
2013, the Utah state legislature passed several laws to petition the federal
government to surrender control of the vast amounts of territory it con-
trolled within the state.57 One of the provisions authorized the use of tax-
payer money and appropriated nearly $8 million from the state's Consti-
tutional Defense Fund to assert thousands of R.S. 2477 claims on federal
land.58 Around the same time, the state of Utah and twenty-two counties
began filing lawsuits against federal land management agencies, seeking
rights-of-way over thousands of miles of old, pre-existing routes they
claimed were historically in regular public use.59 Other western states are
watching how Utah's aggressive strategy fares in the courts,60 which is
54. In the Mountain West, OHV recreation is common, "with a higher than average OHV
participation rate of 28% of the population." SIMMONS & YONK, supra note 51, at 19.
55. Id. at 21. Wilderness designation can also eradicate the potential extraction of energy or
developing recreational facilities. Brian C. Steed et al., The Economic Costs of Wilderness, ENVTL.
TRENDS, June 2011, at 1, available at
http://www.environmentaltrends.org/fileadmin/pri/documents/2011/brief062011.pdf (finding that
"federally designated Wilderness negatively impacts local economic conditions," and that counties
with wilderness experience lower household income, total payroll, and county tax receipts than
counties without a wilderness presence).
56. Ed Quillen, RS-2477: Old Roads and New Controversies, COLO. CENT. MAG. (Mar.
2001), http://cozine.com/2001-march/rs-2477-old-roads-and-new-controversies. In Clinton's 1996
designation of Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, local residents and politicians com-
plained they weren't consulted about the designation, which "closed off that land to any develop-
ment of coal reserves." Michelle L. Price, Herbert Hopeful for Utah Public Lands Deal, WASH.
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/17/herbert-hopeful-for-
utah-public-lands-deal/?page=all.
57. Cheryl K. Chumley, Western States Seek Control of Federal Lands, NEWSMAX (Apr. 21,
2014, 3:43 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Cliven-Bundy-Westem-federal-
lands/2014/04/21/id/566804. On March 23, 2012, Utah Governor Gary R. Herbert signed House Bill
148, which demands the federal government make good on the promises made in Utah's 1894 Ena-
bling Act (UEA) to extinguish title to federal lands in Utah. Kirk Johnson, Utah Asks US to Return
20 Million Acres of Land, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/us/utah-bill-asks-govemment-to-give-back-more-than-20-
million-acres-of-land.html.
58. Gail Binkly, Costly Claims: The Fight Over RS 2477 Roads, FOUR CORNERS FREE PRESS
(Sept. 2011), http://fourcomersfreepress.com/news/2011/091101.htm (explaining that HB 76 "estab-
lishes a federalism subcommittee of the Constitutional Defense Council to review federal laws
applying to Utah, and encourages state officials to attack 'unconstitutional' laws and mandates,
providing up to $1.2 million a year for them to do so").
59. Jodi Peterson, Utah Denied Claim to Road in Canyonlands National Park, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (May 13, 2014), http://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/utah-denied-claim-to-road-in-
canyonlands-national-park.
60. See Hoffmann & Imperiale, supra note 47 (explaining that other western states "have
earmarked funds for the study of 'potential"' 2477 claims and will likely increase funding if the Utah
lawsuits prevail).
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why cases reaching the Tenth Circuit will have ramifications for states
looking for creative ways to assert control over federal public lands.
II. R.S. 2477 FRAMEWORK
Passed just one year after the Civil War ended, R.S. 2477 provides:
"[T]he right of way for the construction of highways over public lands,
not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.""1 Like other land grant
statutes passed during the post-Civil War era,6 2 the purpose of the act
was to encourage settlement and development of unreserved public lands
in the American West.63 Therefore, R.S. 2477 essentially provided west-
ern pioneers with an implied license to construct roads in order to divest
the government's ownership of vast amounts of federal lands.4 In 1976,
the enactment of FLPMA marked an express "180-degree shift" in the
federal government's attitude to managing public lands, and the empha-
sis drifted away from encouraging expansion and towards federal reten-
tion using a conservation-based approach.65 However, Congress also
specified that FLPMA was subject to valid existing rights; thus, an R.S.
2477 right-of-way may be valid today if it vested prior to 1976.66 With
this change in the federal government's stance towards public land man-
agement, issues over R.S. 2477 have crept back into the debate over the
future of western landscapes, and federal land agencies and lower district
courts have struggled to agree on a consistent modern interpretation due
to the "cryptic language and sparse legislative history" of this old mining
law provision.67 Much of the focus has been on federally managed lands,
but R.S. 2477 also affects private property owners that took title from the
federal government subject to preexisting rights-of-way.68 For many, the
61. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and
for Other Purposes, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (repealed 1976).
62. See DOMBECK ET AL., supra note 22, at 13, 15 ("The Homestead Act was passed in 1862
and provided free land" for up to 160 acres to settlers who "lived on the land and cultivated it for
five years." "The Desert Land Act of 1877 enabled settlers to buy 640 acres of desert land for $1.25
per acre if they constructed irrigation systems.").
63. See McIntosh, supra note 7, at 18 (explaining that in the Homestead Act, the Desert Lands
Act, and the Mining Act of 1872, Congress put forth a simple proposition to prospective landowners:
"Work the land, and we will reward you with a property interest .... but specifically conditioned on
the exertion of effort to create a lasting kind of development . . . that would contribute to the settle-
ment of the west's open territory").
64. Lindsay Houseal, Comment, Wilderness Society v. Kane County, Utah: A Welcome
Change for the Tenth Circuit and Environmental Groups, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 725, 726 (2010).
65. Hillary M. Hoffmann, Signs, Signs, Everywhere Signs: The Wilderness Society v. Kane
County Leaves Everyone Confused About Navigating a Right-of- Way Claim Under Revised Statute
2477, 18 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 3, 8-9 (2012) ("Instead of allowing and encour-
aging citizens to settle upon federal land . . .. FLPMA . .. required federal agencies to begin manag-
ing federal public lands using a conservation-based approach called 'sustained yield,' which con-
templated planning around environmental values and objectives.").
66. LAITOS, supra note 9, at 324.
67. Bret C. Birdsong, Road Rage and R.S. 2477: Judicial and Administrative Responsibility
for Resolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 527 (2005).
68. See McIntosh, supra note 7, at 17 (explaining private landowners have dealt with county
officials claiming "routes that did not appear on title searches . .. were 'highways' established when
the land was once owned by the federal government").
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prospect of having the public traverse through their backyard destroys
the attributes of isolation that make such land valuable to the owner in
the first place.69
At the center of the dispute are conflicting views concerning the ex-
istence, extent, duration, and scope of these preexisting rights-of-way.
Parties with vastly different interests and objectives disagree on how to
define the statute's ambiguous terms such as "highway" or "construc-
tion" and to what degree state law should determine the scope of "ac-
ceptance" through "sufficient public use." Public-access advocates, state
and local governments, and off-road vehicle enthusiasts prefer a broad
interpretation of what actions are necessary in order to establish a public
highway.70 They argue for a more relaxed standard of what constitutes
"continuous public use" because the roadways are often in sparsely pop-
ulated rural communities.7' Thus, even if the roadways' use may not
have been considered continuous "according to an urban point of refer-
ence," the roads were still used as often as the local residents found nec-
essary.72 These state and local officials assert that road access through
federal lands is especially important for economic prosperity in rural
areas where R.S. 2477 roads support recreation activities, in addition to
ranching and mining.73  At the opposite end of the spectrum are envi-
ronmentalists, who support stricter application of R.S. 2477 terminology,
such as requiring extensive frequency of use by the pubic or mechanical
construction of the roadway.74 They dismiss the other side's economic-
livelihood argument and suggest the hidden objective is to use R.S. 2477
as an illegitimate way to circumvent environmental aws and disqualify
large spreads of land from wilderness designation, which must be road-
less.75
A. Ambiguous Terms: Congressional nd Executive Attempts to Shape
R.S. 2477's Application
The Department of the Interior (DOI) controls nearly 640 million
acres of federally owned land, most of which is managed by three agen-
69. For a list of 2477 claims on private lands, see RS 2477: Impacts on Private Property, S.
UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.suwa.org/wp-
content/uploads/PrivatePropertyFactSheet.pdf.
70. See Houseal, supra note 64, at 727.
71. See Phil Taylor, Utah, County Denied Rehearing in Canyonlands Roads Case,
GREENWIRE (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060005472 (quoting Utah
Association of Counties that "[s]parsely-populated landscape connected by seemingly empty roads
are the geographic rule, not the exception, of the American West").
72. Id. ("Utah counties took exception to the 10th Circuit's frequency finding, calling it an
'urban-centric dismissal' of the rural West, where roads are less frequented . . . but are no less im-
portant to local residents.")
73. Alison Suthers, Note, A Separate Peace?: Utah's R.S. 2477 Memorandum of Understand-
ing, Disclaimers of Interest, and the Future of R.S. 2477 Rights-of- Way in the West, 26 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 11l, 111 (2005).
74. See Houseal, supra note 64, at 727-28.
75. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 14, § 15:19.
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cies-the National Park Service (NPS), Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), and Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).76 These agencies must
conduct periodic planning "pursuant to their statutory mandates," and
they are also charged with addressing issues that come up when conflicts
erupt between competing land uses.77
For these federal land management agencies, the absence of any
legislative history concerning R.S. 2477 makes the need for congression-
al and executive guidance crucial. Without consistent federal guidelines
for interpreting and applying the statute, the ambiguity disrupts land use
planning efforts, wilderness area designation, and private property titles
are "clouded by potential [R.S. 2477] claims."7 8 Unfortunately, past at-
tempts to create an agency process for evaluating these preexisting
claims have failed to provide any meaningful assistance.
In 1994, the DOI proposed regulations to create a formal adminis-
trative process by which persons claiming R.S. 2477 rights-of-way could
solicit binding determinations as to the claim's existence and validity. 79
The regulations also put forth a timeframe for resolving such claims and
provided more detailed definitions for statuory terms such as "construc-
tion" and "highway."80 However, the DOI's efforts were ultimately
blocked by Congress, and the polarizing politics surrounding the R.S.
2477 debate have prevented subsequent administrative efforts from
providing much clarity to the controversy.81
In 2003, the DOI signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with the State of Utah, which provided a streamlined application process
where the BLM would acknowledge the existence of an R.S. 2477 claim
by issuing a "disclaimer of interest" if the application satisfied the terms
of the MOU.82 However, the MOU failed to garner widespread support
since it was signed without involving input from the public and excluded
claims involving "sensitive areas like national parks" or wilderness study
areas.83 Because the MOU was negotiated in a setting that included only
parties from one side of the debate and incorporated an overly broad in-
terpretation of what qualifies as a public highway, it is frequently at-
76. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 16-17 (describing the confusion surrounding application of
R.S. 2477 for federal land management agencies).
77. Id.
78. Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 252.
79. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 14, § 15:19.
80. Michael S. Freeman & Lusanna J. Ro, RS 2477: The Battle Over Rights-of-Way on Fed-
eral Land, 32 COLO. LAW. 105, 106 (2003).
81. Id. (describing how the 1996 Congressional Moratorium stated that "without express
Congressional approval, no final rule or regulation of any agency . . . pertaining to . . . 2477 shall
take effect").
82. Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of Utah and the Dep't of the Interior
on State & Cnty. Roadl Acknowledgment (Apr. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/archive/03_NewsReleases/mours2477.htm.
83. McIntosh, supra note 7, at 20.
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tacked as an insufficient basis for asserting R.S. 2477 claims.84 Conse-
quently, costly and drawn-out litigation in federal courts has become the
primary mechanism for resolving the more controversial R.S. 2477
claims like those within national parks or designated wilderness areas.85
B. Judicial Attempts to Resolve the Controversy
Land-access proponents and states attempting to establish routes
through public lands use the Quiet Title Act (QTA) in conjunction with
R.S. 2477 to sue the federal government.86 "The QTA is a limited waiver
of the United State's [sic] sovereign immunity which would otherwise
protect the federal government from suit" where the claimant asserts an
interest in real property against the United States.
One of the first cases to reach the Tenth Circuit, and the leading
opinion on R.S. 2477, was Sierra Club v. Hodel,88 in which several envi-
ronmental organizations sued the federal government and Garfield Coun-
ty, Utah, after the latter announced plans to widen portions of the Burr
Trail.89 Specifically, the county had proposed upgrading a former cattle
trail into a two-lane gravel road that would provide access to a federal
marina.9 0 The Sierra Club sought an injunction against the road im-
provements because of the adverse effects the expansion would have on
several adjacent wilderness study areas.91 The Tenth Circuit majority
decided that an R.S. 2477 right-of-way may be valid today if it vested
prior to 1976, but that the scope of the preexisting right was to be meas-
ured by state law in effect at the time of repeal.92
A more recent case that helped define the requirements and scope of
agency determination regarding R.S. 2477 was Southern Utah Wilder-
ness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management (SUWA).93 The case was
decided following the aftermath of President Clinton's establishment of
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in 1996.94 Soon after the
monument was dedicated tensions grew, and road crews from several
southern Utah counties started grading various dirt trails in the monu-
ment without notifying the BLM.95 When the BLM did nothing to stop
84. See id
85. Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 243.
86. McIntosh, supra note 7, at 18-19.
87. Id. at 18.
88. 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled in part on other grounds by Vill. of Los Ran-
chos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 1068 (concluding that state law should control the scope of the right-of-way).
90. Id. at 1073.
91. Id. at 1074.
92. Id. at 1083-84.
93. 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cit. 2005).
94. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 13-14 ("In September 1996, President Clinton ... exacerbat-
ed the tensions by establishing the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, pursuant to his
authority under the American Antiquities Act, reserving almost two million acres . . . under BLM
management." (footnote omitted)).
95. Id at 14.
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these activities, the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), a non-
profit conservation group, filed an action in federal court against the
BLM and several Utah counties.96 After the district court held the coun-
ties did not require the BLM's permission to undertake routine mainte-
nance on the roads, the Tenth Circuit reversed, and held that "the holder
of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way across federal land must consult with the
appropriate federal land management agency before it undertakes any
improvements . . . beyond routine maintenance."9 7 In essence, this clari-
fied that counties could not simply drive bulldozers and other construc-
tion machines onto BLM land to conduct significant improvements with-
out federal authorization.98
More importantly, elaborating on Hodel, the SUWA decision held
that where the existence of the right-of-way is at issue, the BLM does not
have primary jurisdiction over R.S. 2477 claims and that both perfection
and scope of the preexisting right-of-way are determined by looking to
state law.99 However, the Tenth Circuit's ruling allowed the agency to
make initial "administrative determinations" on the validity of an R.S.
2477 roadway for planning purposes only.100 This meant the agency
could issue its opinion as to the validity-but without carrying the force
of law, the agency's determination "could be taken with a proverbial
grain of salt." 0 1
The court also briefly discussed the burdens of proof in an R.S.
2477 dispute. The court held that the party "seeking to enforce rights-of-
way against the federal government" bears the burden of proof. 02 Thus,
while the SUWA decision clarified which party bears the burden of proof,
it did nothing to define what standard of evidence is used to satisfy the
burden.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit created the "public use standard" for de-
termining when and if an R.S. 2477 right-of-way had vested.10 3 The court
explained that under the common law, the establishment of a public
right-of-way required two components: "the landowner's objectively
manifested intent to dedicate property to the public use as a right of way,
96. Id.
97. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 745.
98. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 15-16.
99. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 757. This holding lies in contrast to the Ninth Circuit approach "which
has overlooked state law . . . regarding the [validity] of R.S. 2477 claims." Macfarlane, supra note 6,
at 233.
100. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 757-58.
101. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 17.
102. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 768-69 (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 147 F. Supp.
2d 1130, 1136 (D. Utah 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining the allocation of the
burden of proof is consistent with "the established rule . . . that land grants are construed favorably
to the Government" (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1136) (inter-
nal quotation mark omitted)).
103. Id.
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and acceptance by the public."""' The first requirement-intent to dedi-
cate-could manifest "by express statement or [be] presumed from con-
duct." 05 Public acceptance has been more difficult to determine, but un-
der Utah law, "[a] highway shall be deemed and taken as dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the Public when it has been continuously and
uninterruptedly used as a Public thoroughfare for a period of ten
years."'06 The SUWA decision provided clarity on issues such as how to
measure public use, which party bears the burden of proof, and defined
several terms such as highway and construction.'07 However, the Tenth
Circuit's decision still left much to be desired for lower courts attempting
to flesh out this vexing frontier law and determine the merits of R.S.
2477 disputes. In 2014, the Tenth Circuit got another opportunity in a
decade-long dispute over an old route winding its way through a
streambed in the heart of Canyonlands National Park.
III. SAN JUAN V. UNITED STATES
A. Facts
1. History of Use Along the Salt Creek Road
Salt Creek Canyon is considered as "one of the crown jewels of
Canyonlands National Park,"10 with its perennial stream providing an
extensive riparian habitat for wildlife, as well as being the area with the
highest recorded density of archeological sites in the park.109 An old pio-
neer route located fifty miles from the nearest city winds its way through
the canyon and "generally follows the course of Salt Creek."o10 Historical
evidence gathered from maps, aerial photographs, geological surveys, the
area's scant written history, and testimony from witnesses who visited
the relevant landscape characterize the history of travel along the Salt
Creek road."' Starting in the 1890s, a homesteader named Lee Kirk set-
tled in an area south of the Salt Creek road, and it was supposed that he
and his successors traversed the path to move supplies for farming activi-
104. Id. at 769.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 771 (quoting Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, 648 (Utah
1929)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 18.
108. Stephen Bloch & Heidi McIntosh, Tenth Circuit Denies State and San Juan County Peti-
tions for Rehearing, S. UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE (Sept. 8, 2014), http://suwa.org/tenth-circuit-
denies-state-san-juan-county-petitions-rehearing-2/.
109. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 7, San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d
787 (10th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-4146, 11-4149), 2012 WL 1074408, at *7 (explaining that "[s]urface
and groundwater associated with the creek support the most extensive riparian ecosystem in Can-
yonlands, other than the Green and Colorado Rivers. Surface water and riparian habitat are among
the rarest habitat ypes in the arid Canyonlands environment." (citation omitted)).
110. Id. at 9.
111. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief at 6, San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d 787 (Nos. II-
4146, 11-4149), 2011 WL 6179568, at *6.
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ties.112 Around the same period, ranchers began moving cattle along the
Salt Creek road between winter and summer grazing seasons and contin-
ued to do so through the 1940s."3 Most of the cattle-herding activities
were conducted by the Scorup-Somerville Cattle Company, which car-
ried out its operations pursuant to a grazing permit issued by the DOI.1 14
There was also some evidence that uranium mining and oil drilling were
conducted in the area, but there was very little, if any, evidence that the
prospectors used the Salt Creek road for these extraction activities.115
With the discovery of Angel Arch,'l6 nascent uses by the general public
along the claimed right-of-way began in the early 1950s.11 7 Characterized
as "exploration trips," these groups of tourists (boy scouts and curious
travelers on horseback and in jeeps) ventured down the Salt Creek route
for recreational purposes."8 It was not until the latter half of the 1950s
that the area saw a significant uptick in the number of visitors."9
2. Modem Use of Salt Creek Road and Events Leading to the
Route's Closure
On September 12, 1964, Congress established Canyonlands Nation-
al Park and reserved the lands within, including the Needles District
where the Salt Creek road is located.120 However, the reservation was
"subject to valid existing rights," which included claims to R.S. 2477
rights-of-way.121 Today, the nine-mile trail known as Salt Creek road "is
the primary way for tourists to reach several scenic sites . . . including
Angel Arch." 22 As it carves its way through the desert landscape, the
unimproved road crosses the streambed many times, and for a long time
jeep travel along the route was a popular choice for visitors not wishing
to make the arduous trek by foot.123 From 1980 to 2012, Canyonlands
experienced the fastest growth in visitation among the state's national
parks.124 As the number of park visitors dramatically increased in the
112. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 20-21.
113. Id.at28.
114. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 10; Answering Brief of
Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 20.
115. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 22.
116. Angel Arch is a natural geological feature within Canyonlands National Park and is "con-
sidered by many people to be the most beautiful and spectacular arch in the park if not in the entire
canyon country." S.W. LOHMAN, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY BULLETIN
1327, THE GEOLOGIC STORY OF CANYONLANDS NATIONAL PARK (1974), available at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online books/geology/publications/bul/1327/sec8.htm.
117. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 23.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 16 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
121. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 5.
122. San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 2014).
123. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 9 ("As the claimed Salt
Creek road winds its way through [the] Canyon ... it generally follows the course of Salt Creek . . .
weaving in and out of the streambed and crossing the channel about 60 times.").
124. Canyonlands saw a 702% increase in visitation, followed by Arches (269%), Zion
(165%), Bryce (142%) and Capitol Reef (96%). Leaver, supra note 48, at 6-7.
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early 1990s, NPS officials began to notice that mounting jeep use was
polluting the stream with engine fluids and degrading wildlife habitat in
the Salt Creek ecosystem.125
In 1992, the NPS started developing its Back Country Management
Plan (BMP) for Canyonlands, and there was considerable debate over
how to balance the public's competing demands for vehicular access and
preservation of Salt Creek's unique natural and cultural resources.126
Upon the official release of the BMP in 1995, the NPS placed a permit
gate on the Salt Creek road and limited the number of vehicles traveling
on the route to twelve per day.127
The gate and permit system was not challenged by San Juan County
or the state, but a complaint filed by SUWA against the NPS in earlier
litigation resulted in an injunction that kept portions of the Salt Creek
road closed to vehicular use.128 Several off-road vehicle user groups suc-
cessfully appealed the decision, and the Tenth Circuit vacated the injunc-
tion in 2000,129 but the NPS decided to keep the road closed while it es-
tablished a new policy regarding motor vehicle traffic on the Salt Creek
road.13 0 After conducting its environmental assessment in 2002, the NPS
concluded that continuing to allow vehicle traffic would result in "ad-
verse impacts to Salt Creek's ecosystem that would impair park re-
sources and values."'3 ' This decision led the NPS to issue a final rule on
June 14, 2004 that prohibited motor vehicles in Salt Creek Canyon above
Peekaboo Spring, as well as the Park Service's administrative determina-
tion that an R.S. 2477 right-of-way did not exist.132 That same day, San
Juan County filed a suit to quiet title, claiming an alleged R.S. 2477
right-of-way along the Salt Creek road.1
33
3. Procedural History (SUWA Intervention and District Court
Decision)
After the county filed its complaint asserting title to the alleged
right-of-way, several environmental groups-SUWA, The Wilderness
Society (TWS), and Grand Canyon Trust (GCT)-moved to intervene in
the district court claiming that a decision to grant the R.S. 2477 right-of-
125. See Bloch & McIntosh, supra note 108 (discussing the Park Service's decision to close
Salt Creek Canyon to vehicular use in 2004).
126. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 15.
127. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra note Il l, at 2 ("From historically
open travel that exceeded 60 vehicles per day . . . the BMP's permit gate reduced the number of
vehicles ... to no more than 10 private vehicles and 2 commercial tour vehicles per day.").
128. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F. 3d 819, 822 (10th Cir. 2000).
129. Id. at 830.
130. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 3.
131. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 19-20.
132. Canyonlands National Park-Salt Creek Canyon, 69 Fed. Reg. 32,871, 32,876 (June 14,
2004) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 7.44(a)).
133. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 20.
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way would seriously threaten their conservation interests.134 The district
court denied the intervention sought by the environmental advocacy
groups, and the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the decision.' The
court reasoned that while the conservation groups have an interest that
may be impaired in the outcome of a title dispute involving an R.S. 2477
right-of-way, the federal government adequately represented those inter-
ests in the Salt Creek matter.136 The environmental groups then moved
for amicus status, and subsequently participated in litigation as "friends
of the court," but not as parties.1 37 This appeal only considered the inter-
vention issue and did not consider the merits of the case.
Upon remand, the district court, after weighing all the historical ev-
idence of use presented by both parties, ruled in favor of the United
States.138 Following R.S. 2477 precedent, the court looked to state com-
mon law to guide its determination of whether the public use amounts to
acceptance as a public highway, and under Utah law, "[a] highway shall
be deemed and taken as dedicated and abandoned to the use of the Public
when it has been continuously and uninterruptedly used as a Public thor-
oughfare for a period of ten years."l39 According to the district court,
"the evidence was not sufficient" to demonstrate that "the road had been
in continuous public use as a public thoroughfare throughout a ten year
period prior to the reservation of Canyonlands" in 1964.140
The district court disregarded the homesteading activities in the late
nineteenth century, as there was "[v]ery little direct evidence" to the du-
ration and extent of travel by these early pioneers along the claimed
route.14 1 The court also found it would strain the language of R.S. 2477
to characterize the cattle-grazing activities as public use because any
evidence of sufficient use was conducted under a proprietary interest,
pursuant to federal grazing permits.142 As for the recreational activities
that commenced in the 1950s, the court explained that the scenic tourism
was "still in its embryonic stage" and "the sporadic trips along Salt Creek
to Angel Arch . . . were still exploratory in nature."1 43 Therefore, the dis-
134. San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc). This
earlier opinion dealt only with the issue of intervention and did not discuss the merits of the case.
135. Id.atll67,1207.
136. Id. at 1167-68.
137. Brief of Amici Curiae Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, et al. in Opposition to the
Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1-2, San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d
787 (10th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-4146, 11-4149), 2014 WL 3795351, at *1-2 [hereinafter Amici Brief
for Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance]. The court may consider amicus filings but the extent and
weight of such consideration is discretionary.
138. San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d at 791.
139. Id at 791-92 (quoting Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, 648 (Utah
1929)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id.
141. San Juan Cnty v. United States, No. 2:04-CV-0552BSJ, 2011 WL 2144762, at *33 (D.
Utah May 27, 2007).
142. Id. at *34.
143. Id. at *35.
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trict court ruled in favor of the United States, explaining that while the
state and county demonstrated a variety of historical uses, during the
relevant period before 1954, "a visit to Salt Creek Canyon . . . was an
experience marked by pristine solitude."
4. Tenth Circuit Unanimously Affirms the District Court
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
considered (1) whether the state and county's claims under the QTA
were timely, and (2) and whether the state and county demonstrated ac-
ceptance through ten years of continuous public use prior to Can-
yonlands' reservation in 1964.145
a. Quiet Title Act/Sovereign Immunity
The United States contended that sovereign immunity deprived the
district court of jurisdiction by claiming the limitation periods in the
QTA had expired before the state and county could take advantage of the
statute's limited waiver.146 Because the sovereign immunity issue was
jurisdictional, the Tenth Circuit addressed it first and held that the claims
of both the state and county were timely. 14 7 The QTA establishes two
different limitation periods for property claims brought against the feder-
al government: "[A] general limitation period and a limitation period
applicable only to claims brought by states."l48
For claimants other than states, a claim needs to be filed within
twelve years of the date of accrual, which means the statute of limitations
started to run when the federal government gave San Juan County notice
that it did not recognize the legitimacy of the county's use of the Salt
Creek road.149 The United States argued that several mid-1970s road
closures south of the claimed road constituted sufficient notice to start
the limitations period; by closing certain segments that connected to the
Salt Creek Road, the U.S. gave notice by limiting the avenues of access
to the claimed right-of-way.5 0 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, explaining
that despite the more restrictive management activities conducted by the
federal agency, these earlier closures did not constitute an exclusive
claim because "the public continued to have access to Salt Creek road
consistent with the claimed right-of-way."' 5 ' Thus, San Juan's claim was
timely.
144. Id.
145. San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787, 792, 796 (10th Cir. 2014).
146. Id. at 792.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 793.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 793-94.
151. Id. at 794.
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The Tenth Circuit then went on to address the timeliness of Utah's
claim. For states, the notice requirement is different because "the trig-
ger . . . requires more than fair notice; it requires substantial activity by
the United States."'52 The court acknowledged that the United States had
conducted "substantial activities" with respect to the right-of-way, but it
nonetheless held that Utah's claim was timely since the limitation period
applied to states only starts to run when the state "receive[s] notice" of
the federal claims.53 Because the route remained "fully accessible to the
public" throughout all of the federal government's activities, and the first
attempt to limit the public's access occurred after 1995 when the NPS
proposed the permit system via the backcountry management plan,
Utah's claim was not barred by the limitation period.154
b. "Continuous Use" (Acceptance of the Salt Creek Road as a
Public Right-of-Way)
The state and county argued that the district judge erred in several
ways by (1) requiring them to demonstrate greater f equency of public
use than that which "the public finds . . . convenient or necessary," (2)
disregarding evidence of cattle-grazing uses under a private right, (3)
requiring a showing of a constructed or "discernible" road, and (4) con-
cluding the burden of proof must be satisfied by clear and convincing
evidence. 155
The Tenth Circuit addressed the frequency of use argument first.
The court held that "frequency or intensity of use is probative of the ex-
istence of a 'public thoroughfare,' and, to the extent recent changes to
Utah law minimize the importance of this factor, it . . . remains pertinent
under federal law."1 56 The state and county were of the opinion that no
particular frequency of use is required and the public use standard is ful-
filled when the route's use "is as often as the public finds convenient or
necessary during the ten-year period."157 They based their argument on
two cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 2008 that proclaimed a
new interpretation of the public use standard where frequency of use is
not a relevant consideration.158 The Tenth Circuit reminded the parties
that while federal courts may "borrow" from state law to aid in their de-
termination of whether an R.S. 2477 right-of-way has been accepted, it
"ceases to provide 'convenient and appropriate principles' when it con-
152. Id. at 795.
153. Id (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(i)).
154. Id. at 796.
155. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra
note 111, at 26, 30) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 797.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 798 (discussing Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 179 P.3d 768 (Utah 2008), and Utah
County v. Butler, 179 P.3d 775 (Utah 2008), which held that a roadway becomes dedicated, and
therefore accepted by the public, when it is created by a public user and held open for such use as is
convenient or necessary for an uninterrupted ten year period).
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travenes congressional intent."l59 The court explained that frequency and
variety of use were both "critical common-law inquiries" when deciding
whether a claimed right-of-way had been accepted by the public.'60 In
addition, the relevant state law in this determination was the law in effect
when the statute was repealed in 1976.161 The court concluded that the
Utah Supreme Court could not "retroactively broaden" the public use
standard by applying a more lenient standard beyond what Congress in-
tended when it preserved rights-of-way existing on the date of repeal.162
Next, the Tenth Circuit addressed the state and county's argument
that cattle-grazing uses under a private right should have been given
more weight in considering the existence of a public highway. The Tenth
Circuit sided with the district court on this issue, explaining that these
activities carried little probative value "because the users had 'proprie-
tary interests in the upper Salt Creek' pursuant to federal grazing per-
mits and a deed to land in the adjacent area.163 Therefore, the Tenth Cir-
cuit upheld Utah court decisions holding that use under private right is
not sufficient to meet the public use standard.
The state and county also argued that the district court erred by re-
quiring them to prove that a discernible jeep road had been "construct-
ed."' The Tenth Circuit did not agree that an error had been committed
and confirmed that although "mechanical construction is not necessary to
prove a R.S. 2477 right-of-way[,] . . . 'evidence of actual construc-
tion ... or lack thereof'" can be probative in determining what satisfies
the requisite public use.165
Finally, the state and county argued that the district judge erred by
applying the more stringent burden of proving acceptance by requiring a
showing of clear and convincing evidence. They believed the correct
standard needed to show the existence of a public thoroughfare should
have been the more lenient preponderance of the evidence standard.166
The Tenth Circuit declined to rule on this issue, stating that a resolution
as to the proper evidentiary standard was unnecessary since the evidence
failed to satisfy either standard. 167 Even so, the San Juan decision went
further in reaching the merits of an R.S. 2477 claim than any Tenth Cir-
159. Id.
160. Id. at 799.
161. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1083 & n.14 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled
in part on other grounds by Vill. of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir.
1992), which held that scope is determined with respect to state law as of date of repeal of statute).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 799-800.
164. Id. at 800.
165. Id. at 800 (citation omitted) (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735,
777-78 (10th Cir. 2005), which held the presence of a discernible road can be considered when
determining whether a public thoroughfare existed).
166. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 21.
167. San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d at 801.
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cuit decision before it. Yet, despite its historic outcome, the full prece-
dential thrust of the decision remains to be seen.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. San Juan's Effect and Precedential Value
On September 8, 2014, the Tenth Circuit denied San Juan County's
and the state of Utah's petitions for a rehearing en banc, settling the issue
for Salt Creek Canyon once and for all. 168 However, there are still thou-
sands of potential R.S. 2477 claims that could have a profound impact on
the future of the West's wild landscapes. It may take decades for courts
to settle the many vexing questions surrounding R.S. 2477, but the San
Juan decision did help to flesh out the meaning of continuous use and
frequency when interpreting this frontier law in the modem era.
San Juan signals a victory for those sympathetic to federal retention
and preservation of western landscapes, but the reach of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision and its precedential value moving forward is less clear.
The decision provides clarity on some issues such as the statute of limita-
tions and the different types of notice the federal government must give
to potential claimants in order to start the limited waiver period. 169 It also
reaffirmed that while evidence of a discernible road is neither a neces-
sary nor sufficient element, it may be probative when determining
whether the required extent of public use has been satisfied.70 Because
the Salt Creek road is regularly washed out by storms and seasonal run-
off,17 ' the decision might signal that establishing a discernible road re-
quires more than temporary seasonal use. The Tenth Circuit did not pro-
nounce any sort of bright-line rule regarding seasonal use, but by reaf-
firming the probative value of proving a discernible road, the decision
might handicap parties attempting to establish the validity of other poten-
tial R.S. 2477 claims in the Colorado Plateau, where spring runoff and
winter snow prevent year-round access.
Perhaps the most important result of this decision was the court's
finding that frequency of use is still a probative consideration when eval-
uating the public use standard. It raises the bar for assembling the requi-
site historical evidence needed to prove an R.S. 2477 route was in con-
tinuous public use. Claimants relying on little more than ephemeral pro-
168. Order of Sept. 8, 2014, San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014)
(Nos. 11-4146, 11-4149), available at http://suwa.org/wp-content/uploads/San-Juan-County-and-
Utah-v-US-9-8-14-order-denying-rehearing-en-banc.pdf.
169. See generally San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d 787.
170. Id. at 800.
171. State of Utah's Reply Brief on Appeal of Findings of Fact, Memorandum Opinion and
Order of the U.S. District Court, for the District of Utah, the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Presiding
at 35, San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-4146, 11-4149), 2012
WL 1151679, at *35 [hereinafter Utah's Reply Brief] (explaining the topography of Canyonlands'
"sedimentary and igneous formations" can make a road's seasonal use less discernible after periodic
flooding and rechanneling of the riverbed).
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Spector use or cattle grazing pursuant to a federal permit may think twice
before filing a claim. By disqualifying these cattle ranching activities as
serving proprietary and not public uses, the San Juan decision will likely
prevent a substantial number of old roads from being recognized as R.S.
2477 rights-of-way.172
The Tenth Circuit sent an important message when it proclaimed
that state law cannot retroactively attempt to broaden the scope of con-
tinuous public use beyond that which was intended by Congress when it
repealed R.S. 2477 in 1976.'17 The court properly followed circuit prece-
dent by retaining the frequency of use requirement74 and refusing to
allow state courts to circumvent what Congress intended when it grand-
fathered preexisting rights-of-way over three decades ago.75 Quoting
SUWA, the court explained that frequency or intensity of use "has always
been pertinent to establishing sufficient 'passing or travel' 'by the pub-
lic."'l 76 Therefore, the frequency component remains relevant in deter-
mining whether a public thoroughfare existed, and recent Utah judicial
precedents cannot alter that consideration. '7
For other states and counties wishing to assert R.S. 2477 claims
against the federal government, this decision will dictate how they move
forward strategically.78 Some believe the decision will have serious ad-
verse consequences for local residents across the West who depend on
access to public roads for their livelihoods.'7 9 However, it would be a
mistake to think states like Utah will back down after the Tenth Circuit's
ruling.'80 Many public access advocates disregarded the decision as an
"urban-centric dismissal" of the views of rural western citizens, which
172. San Juan County was worried about the effect of dismissing the cattle-grazing operations
as "proprietary interests" because "the logical extension of the concept . . . will set the stage to
eliminate pretty much every public use of a road under R.S. 2477. What would qualify as public use
if personal intent matters?" Appellant San Juan County's Reply Brief at 21-22, San Juan Cnty. v.
United States, 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-4146, 11-4149), 2012 WL 2510472, at *2 1 -
22 (citation omitted).
173. San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d at 799.
174. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 762 (10th Cir. 2005) ("The laws
of the United States alone control the disposition of title to its lands. The states are powerless to
place any limitation . .. on that control." (quoting United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1935)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
175. Amici Brief for Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, supra note 137, at 11-12.
176. San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d at 798.
177. See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 14, § 15:19.
178. Soon after the decision, the state of Utah began developing evidence of "frequency of
use" in order to meet the proper standard reaffirmed by the Tenth Circuit. See Amy Joi O'Donoghue,
Courtroom Defeat Fails to Back Utah Off Roads Fight, DESERET NEWS (Apr. 29, 2014, 9:15 AM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865601968/Courtroom-defeat-fails-to-back-Utah-off-roads-
fight.html.
179. See Appellant San Juan County's Reply Brief, supra note 172, at 22.
180. The Utah attorney general's office and county officials "say they intend to keep battling
for local control over another 14,000 roads" within the state. Jodi Peterson, Utah Denied Claim to




may only fuel their growing hostile attitudes toward the federal govern-
ment."'
One issue the Tenth Circuit did not resolve was the dispute over the
proper evidentiary standard for proving the existence of a public thor-
oughfare. While the Tenth Circuit's earlier decision in SUWA v. BLM
discussed which party bears the burden of proof, clarifying the proper
evidentiary standard for an R.S. 2477 claim under the QTA was an issue
of first impression before the court.' 82 Because the outcome of an R.S.
2477 claim depends so much on weighing the evidence of historical pub-
lic use, a ruling on the correct standard would have provided much-
needed precedent. The district court believed the more stringent clear and
convincing evidentiary standard was proper since that is the standard
applied by Utah common law and because of the long-standing notion
that federal land grant statutes are construed in favor of the United
States. The state of Utah argued for a "preponderance of the evidence
standard," a more liberal construction in support of the policies behind
R.S. 2477's enactment that encouraged private parties to settle the West
and divest the federal government of public lands in the name of eco-
nomic progress.184 In other words, because the "condition of the country"
in 1866 favored rapid western expansion and the creation of rights-of-
way across public lands to facilitate that process, Congress intended a
less restrictive standard of proof in establishing R.S. 2477 rights-of-
way.185 Although the San Juan decision went further in fleshing out R.S.
2477 jurisprudence at the circuit level than any case before it, the Tenth
Circuit should have settled this issue. Perhaps the court thought it would
be issuing an advisory opinion if it elaborated on the proper standard of
proof, since it agreed with the district court judge that the evidence failed
to satisfy either standard. However, it would not have merely been advi-
sory because the decision would directly affect the rights and obligations
of the county and state in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of other cases it
was currently gathering evidence for.' 86 In addition, appellate courts have
a responsibility to guide lower courts and administrative agencies in their
181. See Taylor, supra note 71. Utah residents explain that "empty roads are the geographic
rule, not exception, of the American West," and they take issue to dictating frequency of use accord-
ing to an "urban point of reference." Id.
182. Appellant San Juan County's Reply Brief, supra note 172, at 16-17.
183. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 32 ("[T]he clear and con-
vincing evidence standard . . . . is compelled by the canon of construction that federal land-grant
statutes are strictly construed in favor of the United States.").
184. Utah's Reply Brief, supra note 171, at 18-19, 21-22.
185. Id. at 21-22 ("[Se]ttlement was the sole interest of the federal government in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, and allowing individual access was such a given factor that is seldom
discussed." (internal quotation mark omitted)).
186. Appellant San Juan County's Reply Brief, supra note 172, at 16-17 ("[L]egal predicate
for further actions are not advisory.") (citing 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION
AND RELATED MATTERS § 3529.1 (3d ed. 2011)).
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application of legal principles to future cases or controversies., The
lower courts rely on appellate decisions as persuasive authority and
would have benefitted from a simple determination of the correct stand-
ard to apply. With thousands of other potential claims lurking on millions
of acres of public lands, the Tenth Circuit did a disservice to land man-
agement agencies trying to plan around this "very murky body of law." 88
Nevertheless, the higher standard of proving a public thoroughfare exist-
ed by clear and convincing evidence is probably the correct one. In Utah,
this is the standard applied by the courts, and it is also consistent with the
broad principle of sovereign immunity that doubts surrounding land
grant issues are resolved in favor of the federal government.189 Neverthe-
less, a circuit decision on this issue would be helpful to lower courts,
land management agencies, and individuals deciding whether the pursuit
of gathering vast amounts of historical evidence is worth the effort.
Assembling the requisite evidence to convince a court that an old
pioneer trail is an R.S. 2477 public highway is no simple task. Because
"rights-of-way were self-executing and required no formal approval from
the federal government" under R.S. 2477, most antique routes are not
recorded in public records.90 It requires significant historical research,
including an analysis of old land records, geological surveys, maps, aeri-
al images produced from Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), and mining
and grazing document assessments.1 9  Many of these claims exist in
memory only, and proving an R.S. 2477 right-of-way existed prior to
1976 typically involves an army of lawyers touring the state and taking
depositions of elderly witnesses attesting to the route's use.192 This
makes pursuing an R.S. 2477 claim a costly endeavor.'93 While the San
Juan case certainly set the bar higher, the fact that each R.S. 2477 route
is unique and requires its own road-by-road analysis might limit the ef-
fect of the Salt Creek decision to some extent. The Tenth Circuit recog-
nized that "[i]n the end, whether the public used the claimed road contin-
uously . . . is a factual issue," alluding to the notion that any R.S. 2477
decision is difficult to predict until all the evidence unique to that par-
187. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 20, 32 (discussing the Tenth Circuit's failure to decide on the
merits of another contentious R.S. 2477 case involving four large parcels of federally managed land
in Kane County, Utah).
188. Id. at 31.
189. Amici Brief for Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, supra note 137, at 5 (explaining the
state is wrong to suggest he policies behind R.S. 2477 require a more liberal construction).
190. Suthers, supra note 73, at 113.
191. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 9.
192. See Maffly, supra note 13.
193. See id. (explaining that the state's R.S. 2477 effort "is among the costliest legal undertak-
ings ever pursued by Utah officials").
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ticular road is laid out before the court.194 This might minimize the prec-
edential value of any individual case.'95
The next R.S. 2477 case decided by the Tenth Circuit was Kane
County v. United States,19 6 an appeal from a district court judge's 2013
ruling in favor of Kane County and Utah in their efforts to claim R.S.
2477 rights-of-way in the Bald Knoll area.97 The district court awarded
Kane County title to twelve of the fifteen claimed roads, four of which
are located inside the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.198
The Tenth Circuit then awarded the state and county title to six of the
twelve roads and held the court had no jurisdiction to hear claims regard-
ing the remaining six because there was no dispute as to legal title.1 9 9
Like the Salt Creek road, several of the routes are unimproved jeep trails
and one is inside a wilderness study area.200 However, the roads at issue
in Kane connect to other roads and their historic use by the public was
less disputed.2 0 1 As the previous paragraph hypothesized, the merits of
the San Juan case did not come into play, and the Kane case illustrates
the limited effect of any individual case on the outcome involving roads
that are have different characteristics and their own unique history of
202use.
B. Prevailing Uncertainty (and Potential Nonlitigation Alternatives)
Despite the recent clarity provided by the Tenth Circuit on R.S.
2477 jurisprudence, the depth of evidentiary analysis in San Juan deci-
sion is the exception, not the rule. There still exists considerable uncer-
tainty for federal land agencies attempting to establish wilderness man-
agement plans, private property owners struggling to sort out potential
clouds on title, and local government officials planning for road use and
203
development strategies. 2 Several DOI agencies attempted to provide a
formal adjudication process in 1994, but Congress blocked the at-
194. San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787, 801 (10th Cir. 2014).
195. Id. (acknowledging that "[t]he state and county put on a strong case, but so did the United
States. In the end .... [i]t is the role of the judge to weigh the evidence presented at a bench trial").
196. 772 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2014).
197. Bloch & McIntosh, supra note 108; Tenth Circuit Denies SUWA 's Intervention in Kane
R.S. 2477 Bald Knoll Appeal, UTAH'S PUB. LANDS POLICY COORDINATING OFFICE (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://publiclands.utah.gov/tenth-circuit-denies-suwas-intervention-in-kane-r-s-2477-bald-knoll-
appeal/.
198. Phil Taylor, Judges Seem Skeptical of U.S. in High-Stakes Utah Road Dispute,
GREENWIRE (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060006616.
199. See Kane Cnty., 772 F.3d at 1212-13, 1222-23.
200. Bloch & McIntosh, supra note 108. The argument that use of a route by ranchers does not
meet the law's requirement that the route be used by the broader public was also at issue in the
appeal. See id.
201. See Taylor, supra note 198.
202. Conservationists had hoped the San Juan ruling that proprietary use doesn't count for
determining the validity would come into play, but it did not. Taylor, supra note 198.
203. See Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 252.
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tempt.204 Utah's 2003 MOU has been discredited for its failure to include
a provision for public involvement in the acknowledgement process, and
some critics have questioned its legality.205 Perhaps the San Juan deci-
sion provides a more thorough roadmap for agencies, but there are still
other non-litigation approaches that could establish a more consistent
framework to predict the validity and resolve future R.S. 2477 claims.
One potential method that has been suggested is the use of agency arbi-
tration using a tiered approach where agencies have the authority to re-
solve less controversial R.S. 2477 claims through a simple application
process.206 The DOI has used alternative dispute resolution before, which
it credited with a "43 percent reduction in formal case filings between
,2071992 and 1993." However, more controversial claims, such as those
impacting wilderness designation, the need for public input, and judicial
resolution would still require case-by-case litigation in federal courts.208
This tiered approach would result in more efficient resolution of claims
that are less disputed, while still allowing for input from public interest
groups and government transparency in claims that are more politically
controversial.209 Using a nonlitigation alternative will not solve all the
problems that make up the legal quagmire presented by this old frontier
law, and agency arbitration might not find enough support in a polarized
Congress, but it is worth considering its implementation as a mechanism
to ease the burden on federal land management agencies trying to sort
out the validity of future R.S. 2477 claims.
C. The Battle Over Control ofPublic Lands and R.S. 2477 Moving
Forward
In the case of Salt Creek, local governments spent over $1 million
battling for this single dirt road.210 It is unlikely the state of Utah has
spent millions of taxpayer dollars simply to assist local residents wanting
to drive their Jeeps to scenic sites like Angel Arch. It is more likely part
of an experiment by the state to use R.S. 2477 as a mechanism to put its
204. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 14, § 15:19 ("The BLM, the NPS, and the FWS in
1994 jointly issued proposed regulations to clarify the application of R.S. 2477 and provide a formal
adjudication process by which validly acquired rights-of-way may be recognized and regulated.
Congress thereafter prohibited the Department from finalizing the regulations . . . and the regulations
were not issued." (footnotes omitted)).
205. See Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush II, 14
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 363, 400 (2004) (describing the MOU as a "sweetheart deal[]" and
charging that "reliance on the recordable disclaimer regulations to provide the substantive criteria for
what qualifies as a valid existing right under FLPMA, in the absence of the explicit authorization
required by section 108, is probably illegal").
206. See Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 249-50 ("[M]any claims ... lie at the ends of the spec-
trum and are either clearly valid or are clearly not valid. These outlying claims could be easily re-
solved through a simple application process, allowing those seeking to establish a right-of-way ... to
petition for an agency designation.").
207. Id at 249.
208. Id. at 251.
209. Id. at 228.
210. Binkly, supra note 58.
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hostility toward federal land management into legal action. Yet, despite
the massive amounts of money poured into Utah's land grab efforts, state
victories have been few thus far, especially regarding routes like Salt
Creek that do not connect to other roads used by the general public. 211
Still, other western states are watching Utah's aggressive R.S. 2477 at-
tempts, especially in New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming where many
preexisting rights-of-way likely exist and where Tenth Circuit decisions
are binding authority on federal courts in those states. In Colorado, po-
tential R.S. 2477 claims threaten more than 300,000 acres of land in
212Moffat County alone. The resolution of each case decided by the Tenth
Circuit may deter or encourage these other states to pursue their own
claims of routes on public lands depending on the outcome. However, to
determine what constitutes a highway under the statute, courts look to
state law and standards can vary from state to state.213 For example, Col-
orado has no specific time frame for proving continuous use, while Utah
214does. Even in other western states where Tenth Circuit decisions pro-
vide persuasive authority, many officials are eagerly waiting to "jump on
the R.S. 2477 bandwagon" if the courts validate even a fraction of Utah's
claims.215 Several states have already allotted funds for the purpose of
studying potential R.S. 2477 "highways," and it would not be a surprise
if funding increased following any successful litigation involving Utah's
1 - 216claims.
For this reason, environmentalists worry that a threat to one protect-
ed region presents risks to the environmental integrity of all wild land-
scapes burdened by adjacent pioneer routes with R.S. 2477 potential.217
Some worry the hidden goal is to open up these protected areas to natural
resource extraction after validated R.S. 2477 claims disqualify them from
permanent preservation designations, since a road cannot bisect potential
reserves such as wilderness study areas.2 18 Regardless of the motives
behind R.S. 2477's resurrection, these roads are sure to generate funda-
mental disagreements between the values of access and preservation.
CONCLUSION
Besides marking a victory for federal control and environmental
preservation advocates, the San Juan decision fills a much needed gap in
R.S. 2477 case law and helps pave the way for other similar claims that
211. See id
212. R.S. 2477, WILDERNESS SoC'Y, http://wilderness.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Complete-
Congressional-Briefing-Book-09.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2015).
213. Binkly, supra note 58.
214. Id. ("In Utah ... a route must have been used for 10 years continuously.").
215. Hoffmann & Imperiale, supra note 47.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id. (explaining that once courts validate the claims, the state might be able to open up
the land to oil and gas exploration and other extractive industries).
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are sure to come before federal courts. While the Tenth Circuit helped to
establish a working framework for determining the validity of such
preexisting rights-of-way, the more recent Kane County case demon-
strates the heavy emphasis on evaluating historical evidence and the
uniqueness of each R.S. 2477 road is a potential obstacle that limits the
reach of any one particular decision. It might take decades for courts to
sort out questions relevant to evaluating the existence, scope, duration,
and extent of use of the many preexisting frontier highways across the
western United States. The use of agency arbitration in noncontroversial
cases provides one mechanism that could ease the burden of land agen-
cies and private property owners attempting to sort out these issues.
Future litigation will be determined by a careful analysis of the
meaning and intent of R.S. 2477 and the evaluation of historical evidence
of a route's use in each case, but it is hard to ignore the passionate feel-
ings generated by "the magnificence of the natural wonders" at the end
of each road, as well as the broader political ramifications at play.2 19 De-
spite the uncertainty surrounding this vexing frontier law, one thing is
certain: other western states wishing to retake federally owned lands
within their borders are eagerly watching the battle taking place in
Utah's federal courts. The outcome there may dictate how aggressively
these other states decide to use R.S. 2477 as a mechanism to assert their
hostility against federal land management.
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219. Utah's Reply Brief, supra note 171, at 36.
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